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Throughout the United States, consolidation in the hospital industry is altering the local
market structure for hospital services. During the second half of the 1990s, a wave of hospital
consolidation occurred in the United States. One source puts the total number of hospital
mergers from 1994-2000 at over 900 deals (Jaklevic, 2002, and www.levinassociates.com),
on a base of approximately 6,100 hospitals. Many of these mergers have occurred in small
markets, thereby resulting in merger for monopoly. Even some very large urban markets
such as Boston, Minneapolis, and San Francisco are now dominated by 2 to 3 large hospital
systems. Not surprisingly, many health plans have complained about rising prices as a result
of these consolidations (Lesser and Ginsburg, 2001).
This surge in consolidation activity has led to concern about the impacts of this consolida-
tion on competition in local markets for hospital services. The federal antitrust enforcement
agencies have brought challenges in a number of cases against hospitals seeking to merge.
The courts, however, have ruled against the antitrust enforcement agencies on every hospital
merger case tried in the last decade (Gaynor and Vogt, 2000).
There have been a number of studies which have examined the relationship between
hospital market structure and performance (e.g., Dranove et al., 1993; Connor et al., 1998;
Krishnan, 2001; Dranove and Ludwick, 1999). The vast majority of these studies ¯nd a
positive association between concentration and price or price-cost margins.1 There have also
been a smaller number of studies which examine the relationship between concentration and
hospital quality or service o®erings (e.g., Dranove et al., 1992; Kessler and McClellan, 2000;
Volpp and Waldfogel, 2000). There is no clear pattern in the results of these studies: some
¯nd that concentration is associated with lower quality, while others do not.
While these studies have proven very valuable by uncovering consistent patterns in the
data, they are subject to the usual criticism that it is very hard to know if \Structure-
1For exceptions see Lynk (1995); Lynk and Neumann (1999).
1Conduct-Performance" (SCP) studies identify competition (Schmalensee, 1989; Bresnahan,
1989; Gaynor and Vogt, 2000). Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) have developed a method for
examining the impact of market structure on competition that is not subject to the problems
associated with the SCP approach.2 The Bresnahan and Reiss (BR) method uses a simple,
general entry condition to model market structure. The intuition is that if the population
(per-¯rm) required to support a given number of ¯rms in a market grows with the number
of ¯rms then competition must be getting tougher, thereby shrinking pro¯t margins and
requiring a larger population to generate the variable pro¯ts necessary to cover entry costs.
Thus, the key data for this method are market structure and population, which are commonly
available and accurately measured.
In particular, the BR method does not require data on price-cost margins or on prices.
The former are commonly considered to be subject to biased measurement. Measured prices
will also be biased in industries where list prices do not represent transaction prices. This is
particularly true for the hospital industry, where insurance companies negotiate substantial
discounts from list prices (called \charges"). This is also true in some other industries, such
as automobiles.3
In this paper we augment the BR approach to take advantage of quantity data, and
apply it to local markets for hospital services. This augmented approach takes advantage of
the additional information contained in quantity, without imposing restrictions signi¯cantly
beyond those implied by the original approach. Further, it allows for qualitative welfare
inference. If quantity increases with entry, consumers are clearly better o®. If the entry of
an additional ¯rm is not accompanied by any increase in quantity, however, then it cannot be
social welfare enhancing, since it carries with it additional ¯xed costs (Berry and Waldfogel,
1999; Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). Our approach allows us to test for whether entry
2Two such issues include the endogeneity of market structure measures and mismeasurement of prices
and price-cost margins.
3An alternative approach to the BR method which avoids the problems associated with SCP is structural
modeling of demand and price setting by ¯rms (Bresnahan, 1989; Berry et al., 1998). This approach requires
more assumptions to put the necessary structure on the problem. It also does not readily lend itself to an
examination of the relation between market structure and competition.
2bene¯ts consumers or is purely wasteful.4 This approach extends the empirical literature in
industrial organization on evaluating the determinants and e®ects of entry5 by adding to the
relatively scarce empirical evidence and proposing a simple extension of the BR method for
industries that possess good quantity data.6
The results from the estimation are striking. In the hospital markets we examine, entry
leads to markets becoming competitive quickly. Indeed, most of the e®ects of entry come
from having a second and possibly a third ¯rm enter the market. The entry of subsequent
¯rms has relatively little additional impact.
We lay out the model and econometrics in Section 2. Section 3 contains a description of
the data. The empirical results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 contains a summary
and conclusions.
2 Model and Econometrics
The model below is based on the entry model of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). Their model
uses the concept of entry thresholds | the market sizes necessary to support successive
entrants to a market | to infer how the toughness of competition varies with market struc-
ture. We integrate an analysis of the quantity transacted in the market with their framework,
which permits a sharper inference on the e®ects of structure on competition.
2.1 Demand and Costs
Hospitals are multi-product ¯rms that provide multiple distinct services (e.g., obstetrics and
cardiac treatment). However, for this analysis, we take the output of hospital production
to be a single product which is the composite of the set of all hospital services. Since most
4We cannot test for socially ine±cient entry in general. That requires evaluating the bene¯ts of increased
quantity from entry against the ¯xed costs. To do so would require the use of price data { precisely what
we are trying to avoid.
5See, for example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991); Berry (1992); Berry and Waldfogel (1999); Scott Morton
(1999); Davis (2002).
6It should also be possible to use a similar method for industries with good data on price, but not quantity.
3hospitals sell a common bundle of services (e.g., most hospitals o®er obstetrics, surgery,
emergency care, etc.), this assumption does capture an important aspect of institutional
reality.7 Further, because of the importance of joint costs in the hospital industry, it is not
clear that it is possible to analyze entry for individual services in a meaningful way.8
In our model the product may be vertically di®erentiated, but is not horizontally di®er-
entiated. That is, we are assuming that hospitals may di®er in the quality of their care, but
that consumers do not di®er in the way they value quality.
Thus, let market demand for hospital services be de¯ned as:
Q = d(P;Z;X) ¢ S(Y ): (1)
Market demand is the product of per capita demand (the demand of a representative
consumer, d(¢)) and the total market size, S(Y ). Per capita demand is a®ected by price, P,
quality, Z, and exogenous demand shifters such as demographic factors and health insurance
coverage, X. We presume that consumers or health insurers acting as their agents care about
the price of hospital services. There is ample evidence on this point (Manning et al., 1987;
Feldman and Dowd, 1986). Consumers also care about quality. Demographic factors (e.g.,
age) are known to a®ect the demand for hospital care, as is income. The market size, S,i s
an increasing function of population and other variables, Y .
For brevity of presentation, we assume that hospital costs are characterized by a constant
average variable cost, AV C(Z;W), and a ¯xed (or sunk) cost, F(Z;W), depending upon
quality, Z, and cost-shifters, W.9
7The majority of buyers of hospital services are managed care insurance plans, which purchase a bundle
of hospital services for their enrollees. This assumption is nearly universally used in economic and antitrust
analyses of the hospital industry (see Dranove and White, 1994; Gaynor and Vogt, 2000).
8For an exception, however, see Dranove et al. (1992).
9The assumption of constant average variable costs is not restrictive. Inferences from this model regarding
conduct are unchanged even with U-shaped average costs (see Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991, 1988).
42.2 Equilibrium in Price and Quality
Through a process we do not model explicitly, a symmetric equilibrium in price and quality
is reached in each market. For a market with N ¯rms, we will denote these equilibrium
values PN;Z N. They depend upon demand and cost conditions as well as the toughness of
competition, represented here by µN:10
PN = P(X;W;µN) (2)
ZN = Z(X;W;µN) (3)
These equilibrium values of P and Z induce equilibrium values of quantity, ¯xed costs,
and variable pro¯ts:
dN = d(PN;Z N;X) (4)
FN = F(ZN;W;N) (5)
VN = PN ¡ AV C(ZN;W) (6)
Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), we also allow ¯xed costs to depend directly on
N, re°ecting perhaps the existence of a scarce resource like a desirable location or a pool
of entrepreneurs with heterogeneous geographic preferences, so that the ¯xed costs of entry
may be higher for later entrants. As we will see below, allowing this direct dependency
makes it impossible to infer the toughness of competition from entry thresholds absent some
additional assumption.
10Tougher competition with more competitors is a robust prediction of theoretical oligopoly models (Sut-
ton, 1991; Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991).
52.3 Entry
A hospital will enter a local market if it can earn non-negative pro¯ts. The Nth ¯rm in a
market earns pro¯ts equal to:
¦N =( PN ¡ AV CN))
S
N
dN ¡ FN (7)
Here, AV CN is the average variable cost induced by the equilibrium quality ZN.
The minimum market size necessary to support N ¯rms in the market, SN, is derived by






(PN ¡ AV CN)dN
(8)
The per-¯rm entry threshold for N ¯rms, sN, is the ratio of equilibrium ¯xed costs to
the product of equilibrium variable pro¯ts and equilibrium per-capita demand. Following
Bresnahan and Reiss, we examine ratios of entry thresholds to measure the rate at which
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The entry threshold ratio, sN+1=sN, measures the product of two things: the change in
¯xed costs as N increases and the change in per-capita variable pro¯ts as N increases. The
change in variable pro¯ts may be further decomposed into the change in per-capita quantity
transacted and average variable pro¯t. If competition is becoming tougher with entry,
dN+1
dN
should be greater than one and
PN+1¡AV CN+1
PN¡AV CN less than one (with PN falling or ZN rising
with rising N).
Discounting for the moment the potential for changing ¯xed costs, a threshold ratio of
one represents an unchanging level of competition, while a threshold ratio greater than one
represents an increase in the toughness of competition. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) interpret
6a ratio sN+1=sN & 1a sN !1as most naturally re°ecting a market converging to the
(unchanging) competitive equilibrium as the number of ¯rms increases.
As equation 9 makes clear, the entry threshold ratios alone cannot separately identify
the e®ect of entry on the toughness of price competition and the e®ect of entry on ¯xed
costs.11 Our addition to the Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) framework is the use of information
on quantity transacted to separately identify the quantity e®ect, dN+1=dN.
2.4 Econometrics
We observe the number of ¯rms (N) and quantity (Q) for each market, so we seek equations




SdNVN ¡ FN + ² (10)
QN = SdN + º (11)
Recall, however, that market size (S) is a function of population (Y ). Per-capita demand
(dN) and variable pro¯ts (VN) are functions of equilibrium price and quality (PN, ZN), and
¯xed costs (FN) are a function of equilibrium quality. Both equilibrium price and quality
are functions of demand shifters (X), cost shifters (W), and the toughness of competition
(µN). However, we do not observe P, Z,o rµ. We therefore express dN, VN, and FN as
reduced form functions of the observables X and W. We capture µN, how the toughness
of competition changes with the number of ¯rms, °exibly and non-parametrically via sums










2. Notice that these sums are cumulative,
so that, for example, (±3)2 represents the marginal increase in per-capita quantity brought
11Notice that, like Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), we can separate average variable pro¯t from ¯xed costs only
through a functional form assumption (speci¯cally, the error term in the pro¯t equation in the econometric
model enters additively).
7about by entry of the third ¯rm, relative to the per-capita quantity of a two-¯rm market. The
terms are squared simply to avoid the estimation returning negative parameter estimates.
The econometric model therefore also includes the following four equations:
S = Y¸ (12)




2 + ´ (13)




2 + ¯´ (14)





We model the pro¯t equation error, ², and the quantity error, º, as independent normals.
Each has zero mean and constant variance, with ¾² normalized to one. We think of ² as
representing unmodelled di®erences in ¯xed costs across markets and º representing transient
demand shocks, explaining its absence from equation 10.
Correlation between the two equations enters through ´, which we assume is independent
of the other errors. This error may represent unmodelled shifters of per-capita demand or of
variable costs (in which case the parameter ¯>0) or it may represent heterogeneity across
markets in µ, the toughness of price competition, controlling for N (in which case ¯<0).
Of course, ´ may contain elements of both, in which case the sign of ¯ merely tells us which
of the two e®ects dominates.
The inclusion of a non-degenerate ´ in the model creates a selection e®ect. Suppose that
the unobserved factors in ´ are demand-shifters. Then markets with higher than average ´
will have both higher than average per-capita quantity and a higher than average number
of ¯rms. But this association will occur for reasons unrelated to competition. Similarly, if
markets vary in the toughness of competition, high-´ markets will have high quantity and
low numbers of ¯rms.
8Writing VN(´) and dN(´) for emphasis, consider the contribution to the likelihood func-


























To arrive at the unconditional contribution to the likelihood function, we must integrate
over ´, and this requires choosing a distribution for ´. Rather than assuming a particular
functional form for the distribution of ´, we choose to approximate this distribution us-
ing a discrete factor approximation (Heckman and Singer, 1984; Mroz and Guilkey, 1992).
Speci¯cally, let the distribution of ´ with K points of support be:
P f´ = ¹kg = pk k =1 ;:::;K (17)


































The p and ¹ then become parameters to estimate and K is increased until the likelihood
function no longer increases appreciably.
93 Data
3.1 Market De¯nition
The unit of analysis is a market for hospital services. Markets for hospital services are local,
owing to the nature of the service (Frech, 1987). There is no single, agreed upon method for
empirical market de¯nition, although it is clear that the markets should be \self-contained"
in the sense that there is not relevant competition from outside the market. We thus follow
Bresnahan and Reiss by focusing on geographically isolated markets as a way of minimizing
the possibility of competition coming from outside the de¯ned market.
With that in mind, we de¯ne our markets using the following selection criteria. First,
we identi¯ed all cities and census designated places (CDPs) in the United States with pop-
ulations of at least 5,000, using the 1990 Census. This we designate as a potential market.
Second, to reduce the possibility of market overlap, we eliminate potential markets that are
within 50 miles of a city with a population of at least 100,000, or within 15 miles of another
potential market. Third, we eliminate all potential markets in which a hospital was located
outside of the city but within 15 miles. Finally, markets that were on Indian reservations
or located in Alaska or Hawaii were excluded from the analysis. Applying these criteria, we
identify 613 markets with 490 hospitals. Figure 1 contains a map illustrating the locations
of these markets.
As a check of our market de¯nition, we include in our regressions the natural log of the
distance from a hospital market to the nearest city with a population of at least 100,000,
as well as the natural log of the distance from a hospital market to the nearest city with a
population of at least 5,000. These variables should pick up \leakages" to or from nearby
locations.
103.2 Data and Measures
3.2.1 Sources
We use data from a variety of sources, including the American Hospital Association (Amer-
ican Hospital Association, 1990), the 1990 U.S. Census, the Area Resource File (Bureau of
Health Professions, 1996), the InterStudy National HMO Census (InterStudy, 1990), and the
Missouri Certi¯cate of Need Program (Piper, 1998).
3.2.2 The Number of Firms, N
The number of ¯rms is de¯ned as the total number of short-term general hospitals with
50 or more beds in a local market. We eliminate any hospitals with fewer than 50 beds
on the grounds that they are not e®ectively full service hospitals. Military hospitals are
also excluded, since they do not serve the general public. We identi¯ed hospitals and their
location from the American Hospital Association (American Hospital Association, 1990).
Table 1 contains the distribution of hospital market structures and their average populations
in our sample.
3.2.3 Quantity, Q
The measure we use for quantity is total adjusted admissions in the market.12 These data
come from the American Hospital Association, which collects this information from all hos-
pitals in the U.S. on an annual basis (American Hospital Association, 1990). Adjusted
admissions allow for the fact that hospitals provide both inpatient and outpatient care by
creating a weighted average of the two, where the weight for inpatient admissions is 1 and
for outpatient visits is the ratio of outpatient charges per visit to inpatient charges per ad-
mission. There are other commonly used measures of hospital quantity, such as inpatient
admissions alone, inpatient hospital days, or hospital beds. We examined the correlations
12For short-term general non-military hospitals.
11between all pairs of these measures. Each correlation was greater than 0.9.
3.2.4 Market Size, S(Y)
Population, Y , is the key determinant of market size, S. We use data from the 1990 Census
on the population of the places that are markets in our sample. Population means by market
structure are contained in Table 1. The mean population size for the entire sample is 19,102.
Using population of the place may not accurately represent the total population of the
market if individuals living outside the place travel there to obtain hospital services. To
control for potential in°ows, we include a measure of the market fringe population, de¯ned
as the population located outside the place, but within 15 miles. In contrast, some residents
of the place may choose to travel outside of the local market to obtain hospital services. We
proxy for this potential out°ow by including the proportion of residents who commute more
than 45 minutes to work. Assuming this measure is correlated with residents' willingness to
travel to obtain care elsewhere, this should be associated with a decrease in the demand for
hospital services in the market.
Last, we also include an indicator variable for whether the market has a military base.
Since military personnel may obtain health care from military facilities, demand may be
lower in an area with a military base than in an otherwise similar area without one.13
3.2.5 Demand Shifters, X
Referring back to equations (13) and (14), per capita demand, dN, and variable pro¯ts,
VN, are determined in part by exogenous demand shifters, X, such as demographic factors,
income, and insurance. Data for these variables come from the 1990 Area Resource File
(Bureau of Health Professions, 1996). The major demographic factor is age. The proportion
of the population 65 years of age and older in the market should be positively associated with
demand for hospital services. Illness increases with age, and thus demand for health care.
13Recall that military hospitals are excluded from the count of hospitals and from the measure of quantity.
12This population is also eligible to receive Medicare, thereby increasing insurance coverage and
hence demand. The measure of income we use is per capita income for the area population.
This may not only capture the direct e®ects of income on demand, but the extent of health
insurance coverage in the population, since insurance coverage is positively associated with
income.
We also include the number of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) as a factor
a®ecting demand. HMOs have two e®ects on demand. First, HMOs attempt directly to
control the amount and type of health care use, speci¯cally focusing on keeping patients out
of the hospital, directly reducing demand for hospital services. Second, HMOs often contract
with a subset of hospitals in a market to provide services for their enrolled population, making
choices based in large part on price. This leads to hospitals facing more elastic demand for
their services. We use the number of HMOs operating in the county of the market in 1990
(InterStudy, 1990).14
3.2.6 Cost Shifters, W
Both variable pro¯ts (14) and ¯xed costs (15) are a®ected by exogenous cost shifters, W.
Hospitals utilize various labor inputs in the provision of acute care. We use the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services' (CMS) hospital wage index as a measure of hospitals' labor
costs.15 We also include median gross rent, de¯ned to be the median rent paid by renter-
occupied housing units in the market, and CMS's area construction cost index to control
for di®erences across markets in facility or building costs.16 In addition to labor and facility
costs, hospitals may incur costs associated with regulatory compliance. The National Health
Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 mandated that states establish \certi¯cate
of need" (CON) programs (Joskow, 1981). These programs require hospitals and other health
care providers to obtain formal approval before making large capital investments, which
14We thank Doug Wholey for providing us with these data.
15This wage index was developed for the purposes of Medicare hospital payment. CMS is the U.S. gov-
ernment agency which runs Medicare.
16The CMS construction cost index was also developed for the purposes of Medicare hospital payment.
13include the construction of new hospitals and expansion of existing facilities (Phelps, 1997).
We interpret this regulation as a ¯xed cost that hospitals incur when choosing to enter a
market. Our binary measure for the presence of a certi¯cate of need program is CON.
Table 2 contains variable de¯nitions and descriptive statistics.
4 Results
Table 3 contains the parameter estimates. The model was estimated with ¯ve points of
support for the discrete factor approximation. The estimates are organized by impacts of
variables on market size, variable pro¯ts, per capita demand, and ¯xed costs. Estimates of
the elements of the discrete factor approximation are also reported.17
4.1 Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates are largely reasonable. Fringe population a®ects demand 68% as
strongly as does market population. Thus, as one would expect, the population outside a
place a®ects demand, but not as strongly as population in the place itself.18 The presence
of a military base has a small but statistically insigni¯cant impact on demand.
Average variable pro¯ts are positively and signi¯cantly a®ected by the proportion of the
population over 65 and negatively by income per capita. Median gross rent and the number
of HMOs have negative but insigni¯cant impacts. Entry of the second ¯rm (®2) negatively19
a®ects pro¯ts but neither the third (®3) nor the fourth (®4) does so signi¯cantly.
Per capita equilibrium quantity is a®ected negatively by wages, rent, the number of
HMOs, and proportion commuting { all as expected. Per capita income has a positive and
signi¯cant e®ect. The proportion of the population aged 65 or older has a positive but
insigni¯cant impact. Quantity rises with distance to the nearest small city, also as expected.
17Because of the \summing up" constraints appearing immediately below equation 17, p5 and ¹5 do not
appear.
18Setting the parameter on market population (¸marketpop) equal to 1 is a necessary normalization.
19Recall that the sum of the squared ®'s enters negatively in the variable pro¯ts equation.
14Distance to a big city has a negative and signi¯cant impact on quantity, which is unexpected.
This may be due to unobserved heterogeneity { markets that are farther from big cities may
have hospitals that are smaller or have fewer service o®erings. Entry of the second and
fourth20 ¯rms (±2, ±4) have a signi¯cant positive e®ect on quantity, while the entry of the
third ¯rm (±3) does not.
Few of the ¯xed cost parameters are signi¯cant at conventional levels; although, with the
exception of rent, they have the expected signs. Fixed costs rise with the second and third
¯rms in the market, but not with the fourth.
Finally, the parameters of the discrete factor approximation are highly jointly signi¯cant,
and the distribution of ´ exhibits a substantial positive skew. ´ is clearly non-normal,
demonstrating the bene¯t of using the discrete factor approximation. The negative value
of ¯ shows a negative correlation between the unobserved components of VN and dN.A s
indicated earlier, this re°ects heterogeneity in the toughness of competition among markets.
4.2 Ratios
Table 4 contains the estimated population thresholds for a hypothetical market with all
covariates at their mean values. We report threshold ratios for this hypothetical market in
Table 5. Only the ¯rst ratio is signi¯cantly di®erent from one at conventional levels. Point
estimates show rapid convergence to \competitive" levels of conduct. Taking the results
at face value with the Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) interpretation (i.e., taking ¯xed costs
as unchanging in the number of ¯rms), we see that entry by a second ¯rm substantially
increases the toughness of competition. The third ¯rm's entry increases the toughness of
competition little if at all, and the fourth ¯rm's even less. It then appears that the e®ects
of entry on competition are exhausted at two or perhaps three ¯rms.
20It is worth noting that the category here is four or more ¯rms; therefore, the estimate of the quantity
e®ect for the fourth ¯rm captures not just the e®ect of the fourth ¯rm's entry but also some of the e®ect
of successive ¯rms' entry. Also, this catch-all category is quite di®erent from the other categories. Some of
these small cities are likely drawing referrals from well beyond our ¯fteen mile ring for fringe population,
likely in°ating the e®ect of entry in this category.
15The ratios in Table 5 cannot distinguish between a change in ¯xed costs versus a tough-
ening of competition, so we move to Table 6, which contains a decomposition of the changes
in the threshold ratios due to changes in variable pro¯ts, per-capita quantity, and ¯xed costs,
along the lines of equation 9. These results show (at point estimates) that average variable
pro¯ts fall with the entry of the second but not the third or fourth ¯rms. Similarly, per
capita quantity rises with the second but not the third ¯rm's entry. However, per capita
quantity rises again in the \fourth and more" category. This result is di±cult to interpret,
as discussed previously (footnote 20). Finally, ¯xed costs appear to rise for each successive
entrant. Overall, the results paint a clear picture of competition getting tougher with entry
| variable pro¯ts fall and quantity rises. Further, the (qualitative) inference regarding wel-
fare seems clear. Competition results in increased consumption, whether due to lower prices
or higher quality, so consumers must be better o®.21
5 Summary and Conclusions
The relationship between market structure and competition is central to industrial orga-
nization. In this paper we augment the empirical approach developed by Bresnahan and
Reiss for industries where there are good data available on quantity in addition to market
structure.
We use this approach to examine the relationship between market structure and com-
petition in hospital markets. Since the U.S. health care system is primarily market-based,
e®ective competition in these markets is critical. Antitrust authorities have opposed hospital
mergers where they have felt they would be anticompetitive. The courts in recent years have
rejected these attempts to block hospital mergers.
We ¯nd evidence that entry leads to a signi¯cant increase in competition in the hospital
markets we examine. Interestingly enough, most of the impact on competition comes from
21Due to the presence of moral hazard due to health insurance, it is commonly contended that lower prices
in health care markets are welfare decreasing, since they will only exacerbate the excess consumption from
moral hazard. Gaynor et al. (2000) show that this is not true if insurance markets are competitive.
16the entry of a second hospital into a one hospital market. Subsequent entry has a much
smaller estimated e®ect on competition. The policy prescription is that the antitrust en-
forcement agencies should be particularly concerned about merger for monopoly in isolated,
rural hospital markets like the ones we analyze. This is relevant, since quite a few recent
hospital mergers have had this character.22 Mergers that reduce the number of hospitals
from three to two or from four to three have, on average, lesser impacts on competition.23
22For example, cases in Poplar Blu®, Missouri (FTC et al vs. Tenet Healthcare Corporation, et al, FTC
File No. 971-0090), Ukiah, California (Adventist Health System/West (1994, 117 FTC 23)), Roanoke,
Virginia (U.S. v. Carilion Health System (707 F. Supp. 840)). See Gaynor and Vogt (2000) for more details.
23Our results indicate that on average for the markets we study here, entry of a fourth and perhaps a
third ¯rm has little impact on competition. Of course this is subject to the caveat that antitrust impacts
are speci¯c to the particulars of a market. Thus a merger reducing the number of ¯rms from three to two
could be anticompetitive for any particular market.
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21Table 1: Market Structure and Population






22Table 2: Variable De¯nitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name De¯nition Mean Std Dev
Quantity Adjusted admissions, market (1000s) 5.50 7.82
Market population City population (100,000s) 0.20 0.20
Fringe population Non-city population within 15 miles (100,000s) 0.16 0.13
Commuters Proportion commuting 45+ min to work 0.06 0.03
Proportion 65+ Proportion of city population age 65+ 0.17 0.05
# HMOs # HMOs in county 0.96 1.56
Per-capita income City per-capita income ($1000s) 10.77 2.21
CON Dummy for state certi¯cate of need law 0.56
Wage index CMS wage index (base=1) 0.80 0.08
Rent City median gross rent ($1000s) 0.31 0.07
Construction cost Adjusted CMS construction cost index (base=1) 0.88 0.10
Distance!big Distance to place with pop. > 100K (100s miles) 1.02 0.15
Distance!small Distance to place with pop. > 5K (100s miles) 0.29 0.15
Military base Dummy for military base > 500 employees 0.04
23Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimate Std Error t-Stat
Market Size (S)
Market population 1.000 N/A N/A
Fringe population 0.683 0.071 9.65
Military base 0.017 0.018 0.93
Variable Pro¯ts (V)
®1 1.147 0.376 3.05
Wage index 0.122 0.452 0.27
Rent -0.558 0.482 -1.16
Per-capita income -0.027 0.009 -2.96
# HMOs -0.010 0.010 -0.97
Proportion 65+ 1.059 0.431 2.45
Commuters 0.038 0.534 0.07
Distance!big 0.028 0.040 0.69
Distance!small 0.195 0.138 1.41
®2 0.708 0.121 5.86
®3 0.000 0.440 0.00
®4 0.204 0.206 0.99
24Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimate Std Error t-Stat
Per Capita Quantity (d)
±1 29.317 3.892 7.53
Wage index -16.464 4.480 -3.67
Rent -16.980 6.309 -2.69
Per-capita income 0.883 0.153 5.78
# HMOs -0.672 0.161 -4.17
Proportion 65+ 5.348 7.773 0.69
Commuters -55.107 7.869 -7.00
Distance!big -1.863 0.651 -2.86
Distance!small 11.640 2.259 5.15
±2 2.249 0.137 16.40
±3 0.000 0.366 0.00
±4 2.202 0.153 14.43
Fixed Costs (F)
°1 2.946 1.618 1.82
Wage index 1.287 2.326 0.55
Rent -2.974 2.067 -1.44
Construction cost 0.153 0.912 0.17
CON 0.203 0.144 1.41
°2 0.687 0.415 1.66
°3 0.806 0.139 5.82
°4 0.374 0.936 0.40
25Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimate Std Error t-Stat
Error Distributions
p1 0.044 0.012 3.56
p2 0.223 0.086 2.60
p3 0.097 0.027 3.54
p4 0.509 0.090 5.66
¹1 16.280 0.977 16.66
¹2 -3.244 0.819 -3.96
¹3 8.584 0.906 9.47
¹4 0.518 0.668 0.78
¾º 1.698 0.100 16.96
¯ -0.005 0.002 -2.45
Number of Observations 613
Log-Likelihood -1310.03
26Table 4: Per-Firm Population Thresholds





27Table 5: Threshold Ratios
Ratio Estimate Std Error Competition Cournot
s2=s1 1.76 0.096 1.00 2.25
s3=s2 1.17 0.257 1.00 1.78
s4=s3 0.93 0.094 1.00 1.56
28Table 6: Threshold Ratios' Decomposition
Component 2/1 3/2 4+/3
Fixed Cost FN+1=FN 1.14 1.17 1.03
Variable Pro¯t VN+1=VN 0.51 1.00 0.92
Per-Capita Q dN+1=dN 1.27 1.00 1.20
Overall sN+1=sN 1.76 1.17 0.93
29Figure 1: Geographical Distribution of Hospital Markets
30